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Farshad Badie
ON LOGICAL CHARACTERISATION OF
HUMAN CONCEPT LEARNING BASED
ON TERMINOLOGICAL SYSTEMS
Abstract. The central focus of this article is the epistemological assump-
tion that knowledge could be generated based on human beings’ experiences
and over their conceptions of the world. Logical characterisation of human
inductive learning over their produced conceptions within terminological
systems and providing a logical background for theorising over the Human
Concept Learning Problem (HCLP) in terminological systems are the main
contributions of this research. In order to make a linkage between ‘Logic’
and ‘Cognition’, Description Logics (DLs) will be employed to provide a
logical description and analysis of actual human inductive reasoning (and
learning). This research connects with the topics ‘logic & learning’, ‘cogni-
tive modelling’, and ‘terminological knowledge representation’.
Keywords: concept; human concept learning; concept construction; termi-
nological knowledge; terminological systems; logic and cognition
1. Introduction
The point of departure is my special focus on the conceptualisation of
‘learning’. In this research, learning will be seen as the process of con-
struction, and thus, learning will be assumed to be supported by an
epistemology which argues that knowledge is constructed based on hu-
man beings’ experiences, and over their conceptions of the world (see
[25, 10, 6, 28, 26]). According to [3], concepts might be understood as
representations of (aspects of) reality in human beings’ minds. Fred-
eric Bartlett  in his studies in experimental psychology  arrived at the
phenomenon of ‘concept’ with his focus on memory analysis. In memory
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studies subjects recalled details of stories that were not actually there.
Considering concepts as mental representations, any concept could be
recognised to be equivalent to a psychological (and mental) entity (see
[24, 32]).
Furthermore, concepts as mental entities could be studied by the
representational theory of the mind (and the theory of mental represen-
tation); see [30, 18, 19]. In this research, the term ‘concept’ is suggested
as following: “a concept could be said to be a linkage [and interconnec-
tion] between the mental representations of linguistic expressions and
other mental images (e.g., aspects of representations of the world, and
of inner experiences) that a human being has in her/his mind”; see [7].
Kindly observe that the ontological, existential and structural analysis
of these linkages is beyond the scope of this paper, but it could be as-
sumed that humans’ conceptions are the outcomes and manifestations
of their constructed concepts. Let me begin with an example; Suppose
that one (say John) has a visualisation of ‘Book’ in his mind. Regarding
his mental image, he describes (and defines) ‘Book’ by “Set of written
Sheets”. Note that I am not interpreting the truth/falsity of John’s
description (definition) of ‘Book’, but I am just analysing the logical
structure of his description (definition). First, I shall mention that De-
scription Logics (see [1]) and concept languages recognise a definition
of a concept as a definition of a new [and/or more specified] concept in
terms of other previously defined concepts. More precisely, a definition
could be defined as an equation between a concept and its description
(based on one’s conceptions). Obviously, John’s conception of the con-
cept ‘Book’ is transformable into a hypothesis like “Book is a Set of
written Sheets”. The most important word of this hypothesis is the dis-
tinct entity ‘Book’. Therefore, John has established the correspondence
“Set of written Sheets” to the entity ‘Book’. More particularly, John has
created a mental assignment from the description “Set of written Sheets”
to the entity ‘Book’. In fact, John  by means of “is a”  has made a
logical relation between the distinct entity ‘Book’ and the description
“Set of written Sheets”. More specifically, he has made two parallel
relationships (i.e., a (i) hyperonym-hyponym or SuperClass-SubClass
relationship and a (ii) hyponym-hyperonym or SubClass-SuperClass re-
lationship) between a distinct entity and a description. Consequently,
all characteristics, features and properties of ‘Set of written Sheets’ are
assigned to ‘Book’, and vice-versa. From Johns point of view (that has
supported him in producing his pre-conception of ‘Book’), all applica-
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tions of ‘Book’ are determined and supported by his primary mental
expression and definition “Book is a Set of written Sheets”.
This article will  by considering concepts as the amalgamations of
mental images and linguistic expressions  focus on analysing the logi-
cal characteristics of “humans’ inductive1 reasoning (and learning) over
their conceptions”. In fact, it will focus on logical analysis of how ter-
minological knowledge could reasonably be assumed to be built based
on an individual’s conceptions of the world. It attempts to offer an
explanatory framework to draw a linkage between logic and cognition.
It aims at providing a logical background for providing a terminological
scheme and for theorising over the Human Concept Learning Problem
(HCLP) in terminological systems.
2. On Human Concept Learning
In my opinion, one of the most fundamental characteristics of human
concept learning is using background knowledge, which is formed and
shaped over humans’ pre-formed concepts, and, respectively, over their
pre-conceptions. So this article relies on the idea that humans’ pre-
formed concepts form their background knowledge. In general  referring
to [21]  the term ‘background knowledge’ represents the knowledge of
the world in general, or of the life in the specific society, the understand-
ing of which people can be assumed to share as a framework for talking
with each other. It shall, therefore, be claimed that any background
knowledge could represent an individual’s universal knowledge of the
world in general, or of any local knowledge of a specific part of the world
in particular. Furthermore, in the learning sciences, the background
knowledge can be defined as the knowledge that learners have (learned)
both formally in the learning environments as well as informally through
their life experiences (see [20, 5]). Therefore, the background knowledge
of any individual can be constructed based on
(a) her/his descriptions of the world based on her/his pre-formed con-
cepts (and pre-concept descriptions), and
1 An inductive logic is a system of evidential support that extends deductive logic
to less-than-certain inferences, see [8]. The premises of a strong inductive argument
should be capable of providing some degree of support for the logical conclusion,
where such support means that the truth of the premises indicates, with some degree
of strength, that the conclusion is (could be) true.
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(b) her/his own conceptions which are generated with regard to the
structures of different phenomena/things in her/his mind.
However, there are strong dependencies between (a) pre-concept descrip-
tions (and, thus, pre-conceptions) and (b) the structural conceptions of
different phenomena/things. More specifically, any pre-concept descrip-
tion could be interpreted as an expression of a human’s conception of
a phenomenon’s/things’s structure. For example, pre-concept descrip-
tions could be produced based on humans’ qualitative and phenomeno-
graphic realisations of different phenomena/things. Furthermore, human
beings  within processes of concept learning  are concerned with their
explanatory, structural, existential and comprehensive conceptions of dif-
ferent phenomena/objects. According to the mentioned characteristics
of background knowledge, human concept learning could be suggested
as following.
2.1. Human concept learning
Concept learning is an inductive learning theory that is supported by
humans’ inductive reasoning processes. Concept learning is logically
shaped over a system of evidential support, which is structured over
less-than-certain inferences of human beings. This theory is supported
by humans’ reasoning processes based on their constructed concepts (and
their produced conceptions). Concept learning could be generated based
on humans’ background knowledge (and over their pre-formed concepts
and preconceptions) and with regard to their conceptualisations of the
characteristics and properties of concepts and through experiencing (e.g.,
observing, hearing, touching, reading about) various groups of examples
of those concepts. Accordingly, humans could focus on hypothesis gener-
ation. It shall be concluded that humans become concerned with specifi-
cation of the conceptualisation of their constructed concepts within their
concept learning.
It is worth mentioning that some approaches (in educational and
social sciences) have focused on applications of the analysed notion in
inductive teaching and inductive learning strategies (see [31, 22, 4, 27]).
As mentioned, humans could focus on hypothesis generation within their
concept learning. The next section will focus on logical analysis of hy-
pothesis generation. In this research, the main references to logic of
induction, inductive reasoning and inductive concept learning paradigm
are [12, 13, 23, 14, 15, 16, 17]. Also, [1] is the main reference to Descrip-
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tion Logics and Concept Languages. At this point I shall state that De-
scription Logics (DLs)  under a plethora of names (among them termi-
nological systems and Concept Languages)  attempt to provide descrip-
tive knowledge representation formalisms based on formal semantics.
They can support us in revealing some hidden conceptual assumptions
that could support us in having a better understanding of ‘concept learn-
ing’ and in proposing more realisable logical descriptions for it in termi-
nological systems. That’s why I have employed DLs in this research.
3. A Terminological Basis
A series of inductive learning approaches make humans concerned with
three kinds of non-monotonic processes:
1. The process of producing their descriptions of more specified con-
cepts regarding their descriptions of more general concepts. For exam-
ple, Mary could describe her own constructed concept (and conception
of) ‘Red Dog’ regarding her descriptions of her constructed concepts
(and conceptions of) ‘Red’ and ‘Dog’. Also, Ann could describe her own
constructed concept (and conception of) ‘Big Brown Horse’ regarding
her descriptions of her constructed concepts (and conceptions of) ‘Big’,
‘Brown’ and ‘Horse’.
2. The processes of reforming and re-organising their conceptions of
the same concepts with insights based on their acquired knowledge and
new experiences. For example, James could describe his constructed
concept (and conception of) ‘Spring’ by the term “a Season; when all
the Trees are Green”, or equivalently: Season⊓ ∀hasTree.Green. Later
on, he may reform his conception of ‘Spring’ and may produce the de-
scription “a season; when some (and, in fact, not all) trees are green”,
or equivalently: Season ⊓ ∃hasTree.Green.
3. The process of producing their more specific descriptions of the
same concepts with insights based on acquired knowledge within their
interactions with new experiences. For example, James could describe
the concept ‘Spring’ by “a season; when some trees are green”, or equiv-
alently: Season ⊓ ∃hasTree.Green. Later on, he may produce the
more specific description “a Season of the Moderate Weather; when
some Trees are Green”, or equivalently: Season ⊓ ∃hasTree.Green ⊓
∃hasWeather.Moderate.
Analysing the processes involved in human concept learning can be
interpreted as a comprehensive study [of humans’ minds] and as an ex-
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planatory and structural study [of humans’ selves] that enable them to
develop their own understanding of different phenomena’s/things’ real-
ities within the world. It shall, therefore, be suggested that the phe-
nomenon of ‘human concept learning’ has strong interrelationships with
an existential and structural consciousness (that is related to a kind
of ontology; see [29]). It might, then, be said that any human being
actively deals with this ontology in her/his concept learning processes,
and becomes concerned with its specification on various levels of her/his
conceptualisation. Relying on this ontology, human beings focus on spec-
ification and categorisation of their conceptualisation, and accordingly,
they induce [and learn] from the [more, and more] specific descriptions of
their conceptions. It shall be stressed that this kind of ontology is shaped
over the interrelationships between humans’ mental images of the world
and their linguistic expressions of the world. Here I focus on analysing
terminological knowledge construction (and describing the world based
on constructed terminological knowledge) over humans’ conceptualisa-
tion. The analysis consists of two main categories:
I. The produced conceptions of human beings support them in modi-
fying their terminologies. Suppose that Mary already knows about (and
recognises) the concept ‘Cyan’. The general concept ‘Cyan’ is the amal-
gamation of the mental word ‘Cyan’ and the mental image of Cyan.
In this research, it’s assumed that the word ‘Cyan’ belongs to Mary’s
terminologies, and, respectively, to her terminological knowledge. The
concept ‘Cyan’ (i) is already experienced and known by Mary, (ii) is
existing in her terminological knowledge and (iii) could be  terminolog-
ically  interpreted by her (in order to produce a meaningful compre-
hension for her). Then, it can provide a terminological principle in her
mind. For example, she could identify (and interpret) ‘Cyan’ as a kind
of ‘Colour’ (i.e., Cyan ⊑ Colour) in her terminology2. Consequently,
Mary can apply the terminological principle Cyan ⊑ Colour in creat-
ing the new more specified world descriptions over the concept ‘Cyan’.
For example, she may describe a ‘Cyan Stone’ by “a Stone that has
Cyan Colour”, formally: CyanStone
.
= Stone ⊓ ∃hasColour.Cyan. This
concept description (in the form of a concept definition) is expanded
over her/his conception of the concept ‘Cyan’. In Description Logics, a
2 It is worth mentioning that the concept inclusion Cyan ⊑ Colour presupposes
so-called ‘colour realism’.
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concept definition (represented by
.
=) is a definition of a new (or more
specified) concept in terms of other previously defined concepts.
II. The produced conceptions of human beings support their devel-
opmental processes of terminological construction. Suppose that Simon
does not know about the concept ‘Cyan’. Then he  as a basis for
his reasoning (and inducing) processes  generates the general concept
‘Cyan’ and categorises it into his terminology T (let T be a set), i.e.,
Cyan ∈ T . In fact, he tries to provide a background for satisfying the
concept ‘Cyan’ by his terminology. Relying on Cyan ∈ T , T could sat-
isfy Cyan (i.e., T |= Cyan); It means that his developed terminology
could provide a model for satisfying ‘Cyan’ based on his terminological
interpretations. In particular, Cyan ∈ T (as a set membership) could
be developed by designing different world descriptions (in the form of
assertive principles). For example, Simon may construct assertions like
Cyan(c) and Colour(d), where the individuals c and d are the instances
of the concepts ‘Cyan’ and ‘Colour’ respectively. Note that produc-
ing Cyan(c) and Colour(d) are the products of his conceptions and
based on his experiences. Therefore, he  mentally  satisfies the asser-
tions Cyan(c) and Colour(d) by semantic models like “Terminological
Knowledge |= Cyan(c)” and “Terminological Knowledge |= Colour(d)”.
For example, according to the semantic model ‘|= Cyan(c)’, Simon (i)
has experienced the individual c, (ii) has interpreted that c is an instance
of his constructed concept Cyan, and (iii) has made a mental principle
based on the assertion Cyan(c). Consequently, (iv) Simon’s terminolog-
ical knowledge could satisfy Cyan(c). Furthermore, he will be able to 
inductively  subsume more specified concepts and their instances under
his comprehension of ‘Cyan’. For example, he could induce that the Cyan
Chairs are all Cyan (i.e., CyanChair ⊑ Cyan). As another example, Si-
mon  by following his mental principle “Cyan ⊑ Colour” and by consid-
ering the fact that “all chairs are some kinds of furnitures”  could induce
that (CyanChair ⊑ Colour) & (CyanChair ⊑ Furniture). This logical
term means that all Cyan Chairs are Colourful and Furnitures. Accord-
ingly, he can induce that CyanChair
.
= (Chair ⊓ ∃hasColour.Cyan) ≡
(Furniture ⊓ ∃hasColour.Cyan).
3.1. Human concept learning and hypothesis generation
In concept learning, human beings  with regard to a set of experienced
examples and over their background knowledge  focus on generating
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hypotheses. Subsequently, they focus on their generated hypotheses in
order to adopt them in their world descriptions and for their reasoning
processes. More specifically, they construct large numbers of hypotheses
and record them in their minds. Accordingly, they search through the
huge space of their hypotheses in order to find the most proper and
useful ones and to describe and specify their constructed and developed
knowledge based on them. Assessed by mathematical logic, the search
spaces are capable of archiving the reflexive and transitive relations. In
fact, these spaces must be expressed by (i) strictly-less-than (as well as
less-than) and by (ii) proper-subset (as well as subset) relations. Record-
ing the relations ‘a is less than b (and b is greater than a)’ and ‘A is the
subset of B (and B is the superset of A)’ are expressible over reflexive
and transitive relations. Focusing on these characteristics, the search
spaces could be represented by the binary quasi order relation (Q,4),
where Q is a set and 4 is a relation defined over Q. Any infinite sequence
of the elements of Q could contain an increasing pair like (pi, pj), where
i 4 j; see [9, 11]. In my opinion, the most significant characteristic of
a binary quasi order relation is that “if p and q are two elements of a
binary quasi order relation, then they will be comparable, and, in fact,
the relations p 4 q and q 4 p support the comparability”.
According to the mentioned features of search spaces, the binary re-
lation (C,4) over the set of a human’s constructed concepts (represented
by C) is quasi-order and it is reflexive and transitive. The main reason for
applying quasi order relations is the fact that any concept learning relies
on induction and on comparability, and inductive reasoning is expressible
over ‘less-than’ and ‘subset’ relations. More specifically, a quasi-order,
as a well-founded induction, can be applied to the set of humans’ con-
structed concepts (or C) in order to express concept subsumption (or
concept inclusion). It shall be emphasised that concept subsumption is
the most fundamental feature of hierarchical structures in terminological
knowledge. Accordingly, the terminological principles based on concept
subsumption could be expressed.
Mechanism. In concept learning, human beings generate mental
mappings (like L) from their primary constructed set of concepts (or
C) into all its subsets (or 2C) such that: ∀p ∈ C, L(p) ⊆ {q ∈ C | q 4 p}.
L is a proper mental mapping if, and only if, for all constructed con-
cepts A and B, B ∈ L(A) ⇒ A 6≡ B. Going back to the example of
Cyan, for human beings, it is conceptualisable, and thus, understandable
that there is a subsumption relation between Cyan and CyanStone like
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CyanStone ⊑ Cyan. Furthermore, its conceptualisable and understand-
able that Cyan ∈ {Cyan, Stone}. Obviously, Cyan and CyanStone are not
equivalent (they are not the same based on all possible terminological
interpretations). It shall be stressed that there are two kinds of mental
mappings3:
1. Complete Mapping: Considering Cyan and CyanStone, humans
could conceptualise, interpret, and, respectively, understand that
CyanStone ⊑ Cyan (i.e., all Cyan Stones are Cyan). For example, Maria
can reach the concept CyanDoor from Cyan (regarding CyanStone ⊑
Cyan) by means of a complete mental mapping. Then, she can induce:
CyanDoor ⊑ Cyan.
2, Weak Mapping: Regarding isA(Cyan, Colour) ⊑ ⊤,4 Michael
could induce the world description isA(Cyan,Paint) based on his own
conception of “the equivalence relation between the world descriptions
isA(Cyan, Colour) and isA(Cyan, Paint)”. In fact, the world description
isA(Cyan, Paint) could be induced from a Tautology by means of a weak
mental mapping.
4. The Human Concept Learning Problem (HCLP)
Suppose that the function CK(C) describes that a human being has con-
structed (C) the concept C on a basis provided by her/his constructed
knowledge (K). I shall draw your attention to the following components
of knowledge:
Component I (terminologies). T stands for humans’ terminologi-
cal knowledge, which is represented over constructed concepts (in hu-
mans’ minds). The terminological component of knowledge is highly
concerned with (A) concept subsumption (concept inclusion) and (B)
concept equality.
(A) Human beings  by interpreting concept subsumptions (like E ⊑
F )  produce their terminological models (like I) in order to [mentally]
3 I define a mental mapping as “a mapping (function) from a concept into another
concept”. In fact, this function is definable from a mental entity into another mental
entity.
4 isA(Cyan, Colour) is a role assertion (= a world description over a role in De-
scription Logics). It expresses that “Cyan is a Colour”. This world description is a
tautology (it is true for all possible interpretations), and thus, it belongs to the top
concept (or ⊤).
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satisfy the concept subsumptions. Formally, they produce I |= (E ⊑ F ).
This model is semantically valid (and it is logically meaningful) if and
only if the interpretation of E is the subset of the interpretation of F ,
or formally: EI ⊆ F I . Accordingly, human beings by limiting their ter-
minological interpretations to their meaningful understandings could 
terminologically  understand5 that E is the sub-concept of (sub-concept
description of) F , or formally: E ⊑ F . In fact, humans focus on pro-
ducing semantic models (like UND) in order to satisfy E ⊑ F ; Formally:
UND |= (E ⊑ F ). Subsequently, EUND ⊆ F UND. For example, a
terminological interpretation like I could be produced in order to pro-
vide a terminological model and to support CyanI ⊆ ColourI (regard-
ing concept subsumption Cyan ⊑ Colour). Subsequently: CyanUND ⊆
ColourUND, and, in fact, it has been understood that ‘Cyan is a Colour’.
(B) Human beings  by interpreting concept equalities (like C ≡
D)  produce their terminological models (like I) in order to satisfy
the concept equalities. Formally, I |= (C ≡ D). This model is seman-
tically valid (and it is logically meaningful) if and only if the termino-
logical interpretation of C is equal to the terminological interpretation
of D, or formally: CI = DI . Subsequently, humans by limiting their
terminological interpretations to their meaningful understandings could
understand that C and D are equal (C = D). In fact, they produce
understanding models (like UND) in order to satisfy C ≡ D. Formally:
UND |= (C ≡ D). Subsequently, CUND = DUND. For example, a ter-
minological interpretation like I could be produced in order to provide
a terminological model and to support ColourI = PaintI (regarding
Colour ≡ Paint). Subsequently, ColourUND = PaintUND, and, in fact,
it has been understood that ‘Colour and Paint are equivalent’.
Component II (world descriptions). The symbol W stands for hu-
mans’ World Descriptions over their constructed concepts. This compo-
nent of knowledge is concerned with (A) instance assertion (or identifying
a phenomenon/thing as a member of a constructed concept) and with
(B) relation assertion (or relating the instances of various concepts to
each other).
(A) Humans  by interpreting that the individual a is an instance
of the constructed concept C  produce their terminological interpreta-
tions (like I) in order to satisfy the concept assertions C(a). Formally,
5 This ‘understanding’ is a limit of a ‘terminological interpretation’ based on own
‘conceptualisation’. Therefore it is existentially terminological and conceptual.
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they produce semantic models like I |= C(a). This model is logically
meaningful if and only if the terminological interpretation interprets
the individual a as an element of (and as a kind of) the concept C,
or formally: aI ∈ CI . Humans by limiting their terminological inter-
pretations to their meaningful understandings could understand that a
is a kind of C. In fact, they produce understanding models (like UND)
in order to satisfy C(a) (ie. UND |= C(a)). Subsequently, aUND ∈
CUND. For example, Elizabeth can interpret, and, respectively, under-
stand that her personal computer (represented by pcez) is a ‘Machine’.
Formally: I |= Machine(pcez). So, pcezI ∈ MachineI . Therefore,
UND |= Machine(pcez), and thus, pcezUND ∈ MachineUND, and, in
fact, Elizabeth has understood that her personal computer is a machine.
(B) Humans  by interpreting that the relation (a, b) is an instance
of (is a kind of) the relationship R  produce their interpretation models
(like I) in order to satisfy the role assertion R(a, b). Formally, they
produce semantic models like I |= R(a, b). This semantic model is
logically meaningful if and only if the interpretation of the tuple (a, b)
belongs to the interpretation of R, or formally: (a, b)I ∈ RI . Humans
by limiting their terminological interpretations to their meaningful un-
derstandings could understand that the individuals a and b are related
by a relation like R(a, b). In fact, they produce understanding mod-
els (like UND) in order to understand the relation R(a, b). Formally:
UND |= R(a, b). Subsequently, (a, b)UND ∈ RUND. For example, Bob
could interpret, and, respectively, could understand that his magnet
(represented by magb) attracts a pin (represented by pinb). Then:
I |= Attract(magb, pinb), and thus, (magb, pinb)I ∈ AttractI . Ac-
cordingly, UND |= Attract(magb, pinb), and thus, (magb, pinb)UND ∈
AttractUND, and, in fact, Bob has understood that his magnet attracts
his pin.
Component III (rules). Suppose that the symbol R stands for Rules.
First, I shall claim that any rule (in such a terminological system) is
logically dependent on (and supported by) a logical implication. For
example, considering ‘Thirst’ and ‘Drinking’ as two concepts, the logical
term R |= (Thirst ⇒ Drinking) denotes that if one (say John) has been
interpreted [and, respectively, has been understood] to be thirsty and be
an instance of (and described by) the concept ‘Thirst’, then John is,
also, an instance of (and described by) the concept ‘Drinking’. Formally:
[(john ∈ Thirst) ⊓ (Thirst ⊑ Drinking)] ⇒ john ∈ Drinking. This
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logical term expresses that “John is thirsty, and the thirst will be followed
by drinking, so, John is supposed to drink”.
4.1. Knowledge
Regarding the components I, II, and III (terminologies, world descrip-
tions and rules), the triple K = 〈T , W, R〉 could represent the humans’
constructed knowledge. However, it could be believed that the third
component (R) is expressible based upon the components T and W.
Let me be more specific:
a. Considering the logical term ‘R |= (C ⇒ D)’, where R stands for
a rule, and C and D stand for two concepts (concept descriptions), we
can understand that there exists an individual (like c) for which, there
is a logical implication between C(c) and D(c). Formally, ∃c : R |=
(C(c) ⇒ D(c)). Obviously, R satisfies an implication and indication
from a concept assertion (as a world description) into another concept
assertion (as a world description). Therefore, the rule R |= (C(c) ⇒
D(c)) has been split into two world descriptions and over a terminology
(i.e., it has been expressed in the form of two world descriptions and
based on a terminology).
b. Considering the logical term ‘R |= (P ⇒ Q)’, where R stands
for a rule, and P and Q stand for two roles (role descriptions), we can
understand that there are two individuals (like a and b) for which a
logical implication between P (a, b) and Q(a, b) is satisfied. Formally,
∃a, b : R |= (P (a, b) ⇒ Q(a, b)). This formalism expresses that the rule
R satisfies “P implies Q” (where P and Q are two relations between a and
b). Again, this implication has been described from a role assertion (as
a world description) into another role assertion (as a world description).
Therefore, such a rule has been split into two world descriptions and
over a terminology (i.e., it has been expressed in the form of two world
descriptions and based on a terminology).
Taking a and b into consideration, it shall be concluded that the
constructed knowledge could be expressed in the form of world descrip-
tions and based on terminologies. Therefore, the component R could be
eliminated, and, thus, it could be concluded that the tuple K = 〈T , W〉
represents the humans’ constructed knowledge.
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4.2. Knowledge construction – mechanism
The mechanism of knowledge construction must be checked over concepts
and roles.
A. Construction over Concepts. In concept learning, human beings
become concerned with a set of experienced phenomena/things in order
to form new building blocks of their knowledge construction. Expressing
new concept descriptions is highly dependent on:
• a set of Experienced Constructive examples of Concepts (or Exp+c ),
• a set of Experienced Non-Constructive examples of Concepts
(or Exp−c )
over pre-formed concepts (and pre-conceptions). Accordingly, humans
become concerned with a unifying set (like Expc) of their multiple con-
structive and non-constructive examples. Therefore:
Expc = {Exp
+
c , Exp
−
c },
where:
• Exp+c = {a ∈ Expc(W) | C(a) ∈ W} ⊆ CK(C), and
• Exp−c = {b ∈ Expc(W) | ¬C(b) ∈ W} ⊆ CK(¬C) .
In fact, any Exp+c consists of the individuals which could be de-
scribed by humans’ constructed concepts. Any member of Exp+c can be
supported by humans’ world descriptions (based on concept assertions).
Also, Exp−c consists of the individuals which could not be described by
humans’ constructed concepts and cannot be supported by their world
descriptions (based on concept assertions). For example, considering
Exp+Dog as the set of Martin’s experienced constructive examples of
‘dogs’, Martin’s German Shepherd belongs to Exp+Dog. Also, considering
Exp−Dog as the set of Martin’s experienced non-constructive examples of
‘dogs’, a friend’s rabbit belongs to Exp−Dog. Martin  by increasing the
number of his experienced constructive and non-constructive examples of
‘Dogs’  could develop his knowledge of dogs over his own construction,
conception, interpretation and meaningful comprehension of ‘Dogs’.
B. Construction over roles. Describing more specified roles is depen-
dent on:
• a set of Experienced Constructive examples of Roles (or Exp+r ), and
• a set of Experienced Non-Constructive examples of Roles (or Exp−r )
over pre-formed roles (as the relations between the instances of pre-
formed concepts). Accordingly, humans become concerned with a unify-
ing set of their multiple constructive and non-constructive examples with
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regard to their pre-constructions of roles. This unifying set is denoted
by Expr. Then, Expr = {Exp
+
r , Exp
−
r }, where:
• Exp+r = {p, q ∈ Expr(W) | R(p, q) ∈ W} ⊆ CK(R), and
• Exp−r = {p, s ∈ Expr(W) | ¬R(p, s) ∈ W} ⊆ CK(¬R).
In fact, any Exp+r consists of the individuals which could be de-
scribed by humans’ constructed concepts, and, respectively, by relating
the instances of the constructed concepts. Accordingly, any member of
Exp+r can be supported by their world descriptions (based on role asser-
tions). Additionally, Exp−r consists of the individuals which could not
be described by humans’ constructed concepts, and, respectively, can-
not be described by relating the instances of the constructed concepts.
Thus, they cannot be supported by humans’ world descriptions (based
on role assertions). For example, consider Exp+marriedT o as the set of
David’s experienced constructive examples of ‘people who are married
to each other’. David knows that Ronald and Susan are married. So,
the relation (rolnad, susan) belongs to David’s Exp+marriedT o. Now
let Exp−marriedT o be the set of David’s experienced non-constructive ex-
amples of ‘people who are married to each other’. David knows that
Peter and Rebeca are not married. So, the relation (peter, rebeca)
does not belong to Exp−marriedT o. David  by increasing the number of
his experienced constructive and non-constructive examples of ‘people
who are married to each other’ (and by knowing more married and more
non-married pairs of people)  could develop his knowledge.
Conclusion. According to K = 〈T , W〉, human beings  by gener-
ating T and W  support their knowledge (= K) construction. Conse-
quently,
• if a concept assertion (like D(a)) is satisfied by the constructed knowl-
edge, then: K |= D(a) ∀a ∈ Exp+c (W),
• if a concept assertion (like D(b)) is not satisfied by the constructed
knowledge, then: K 2 D(b) ∀b ∈ Exp−c (W),
• if a role assertion (like R(a, b)) is satisfied by the constructed knowl-
edge, then: K |= R(a, b) ∀a, b ∈ Exp+r (W), and
• if a role assertion (like R(a, c)) is not satisfied by the constructed
knowledge, then: K 2 R(a, c) ∀a, c ∈ Exp−r (W).
4.3. From conceptions to predicates
According to my research in [2], there is a sort of reflector functions
from humans’ conceptions into predicates. Obviously, we could not di-
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rectly move from ‘concepts’ to ‘predicates’ (and, respectively, to ‘truth’),
but, I shall stress that the central focus of this research is on a logical
analysis of concept learning and hypothesis generation (and not on an
ontological analysis of concepts). So, logics allow me to relate concep-
tions and predicates. My focus is on the logical fact that human beings
can transform their conceptions [of their constructed concepts] into the
[logically] equivalent ones in the form of predicates. Subsequently, the
expressed predicates provide reasonable logical models that semantically
can satisfy the collections of their generated hypotheses. Representing
Concepts, Predicates, and Hypotheses by C, P and H, respectively, we
formally have: [Reflection: C → P ] |= H.
4.3.1. The detailed examination I
A. Experienced concepts. The set of experienced concepts (or
ExpConcept) is equal to the union of the following sets:
Set 1. The set of experienced constructive examples of constructed
concepts that could be represented by Exp+Concept = {individual ∈
ExpConcept(W) | Concept(individual) ∈ W}. Exp
+
Concept is subsumed
under humans’ constructed concepts. They could be generated over hu-
mans’ constructed knowledge (or CK(Concept)). Consequently, the hu-
mans’ constructed knowledge satisfy their own world descriptions based
on their concept assertions and over their experienced constructive ex-
amples.
Set 2. The set of experienced non-constructive examples of con-
structed concepts that could be represented by Exp−Concept = {individual
∈ ExpConcept(W) | ¬Concept(individual) ∈ W}. Exp
−
Concept is subsumed
under humans’ non-constructed concepts. They could not be generated
over humans’ constructed knowledge (or CK(¬Concept)). Consequently,
the humans’ constructed knowledge does not satisfy their own world de-
scriptions based on their concept assertions and over their experienced
non-constructive examples.
B. Experienced Roles. The set of experienced roles (or ExpRole) is
equal to the union of the following sets:
Set 1. The set of experienced constructive examples of constructed
roles that could be represented by Exp+Role = {individual1 & individual2
∈ ExpRole(W) | Role(individual1, individual2) ∈ W}. Exp
+
Role is sub-
sumed under humans’ constructed roles, and, in fact, under humans’ con-
structed concepts. They could be generated over humans’ constructed
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knowledge (or CK(Role)). Consequently, the humans’ constructed knowl-
edge satisfy their own world descriptions based on their role assertions
and over their experienced constructive examples.
Set 2. The set of experienced non-constructive examples of con-
structed roles that could be represented by Exp−Role = {individual1 &
individual2 ∈ ExpRole(W) | ¬Role(individual1, individual2) ∈ W}.
Exp−Role is subsumed under humans’ non-constructed roles. They could
not be generated over humans’ constructed knowledge (or CK(¬Role)).
Consequently, the humans’ constructed knowledge does not satisfy their
own world descriptions based on their role assertions and over their ex-
perienced non-constructive examples.
4.3.2. The detailed examination II
Humans’ conceptions [of their own constructed concepts] could be rep-
resented in the form of ‘unary predicates’ in order to be described and
represented. Similarly, humans’ conceptions [of their own constructed
roles] could be represented in the form of ‘binary (or any other n-ary)
predicates’ in order to be represented. A predicate could be interpreted
to be an expression and assigner of concepts’ different characteristics.
Then, it could assign different characteristics to [and transmit them into]
propositions (and statements) or even into truth-values. Consequently,
regarding humans’ constructed knowledge (K) and reflecting (mirroring)
the conceptions in predicates, the tuple 〈T , W〉 could be expressed and
anlysed by predicate logic. Therefore, the terminological knowledge (T )
could be structured over (i) predicate symbols (e.g., unary, binary, . . . ,
n-ary), (ii) variable symbols, (iii) constant symbols, and (iv) function
symbols. It is worth mentioning that these four kinds of symbols are
identified as non-logical symbols in Predicate Logic, because they  inde-
pendently  do not cause any logical consequence in logical descriptions.
Also, all world descriptions are shaped by utilising multiple descriptions
over the provided terminologies. Subsequently, a predicate symbol de-
notes something which is a predication of the subject. A variable symbol
is what a human asserts the predicate to it. The constant symbols could
be asserted to any variable. Beside them, function symbols operate the
variable symbols. Taking the translated terminological knowledge [, and,
subsequently, the translated world descriptions] into consideration, we
could express the components of the detailed examination I as follows:
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A. Expressed unary predicates. The set of humans’ experiences could
be represented in the form of unary predicates (ExpPredicate) and be
acknowledged as the union of the following sets:
Set 1. The set of humans’ experienced constructive examples of their
described unary predicates. It could be represented by Exp+Predicate =
{constant ∈ ExpPredicate(W) | Predicate(constant) ∈ (W )} for express-
ing world descriptions based on unary predicates. The experienced con-
structive examples are expressed by humans’ described predicates within
their constructed knowledge (i.e., CK(Predicate)). Consequently, CK sat-
isfies the humans’ world descriptions based on their concept assertions
and over their experienced constructive examples. For example, consider
the constant palm as an experienced constructive example of the concept
Tree. Formally: palm ⊑ Tree within CK. Note that this constructive
example could be subsumed under the described binary predicate (re-
lation) ‘is a’ within constructed knowledge. In fact, is a(palm, Tree)
supports palm ⊑ Tree.
Set 2. The set of humans’ experienced non-constructive examples of
their described unary predicates. It could be represented by Exp−Predicate
= {constant ∈ ExpPredicate(W) | ¬Predicate(constant) ∈ W}. The expe-
rienced non-constructive examples could not be expressed by described
predicates within constructed knowledge (i.e., CK(¬Predicate)). Con-
sequently, CK does not satisfy the world descriptions over experienced
non-constructive examples. For example, consider the constant rose as
an experienced non-constructive example of the concept Tree. Formally:
rose 6⊑ Tree. This non-constructive example is not expressible and is
not satisfied by the binary predicate (relation) “is a” within CK. In fact,
CK does not satisfy the world description “rose is a tree”. Therefore, we
have “¬isA(rose,tree) over the experienced non-constructive example
rose 6⊑ Tree.
B. Expressed binary predicates. The set of humans’ experiences
could be represented in the form of binary predicates (ExpPredicate) and
be acknowledged as the union of the following sets:
Set 1. The set of humans’ experienced constructive examples of their
described binary predicates. It could be represented by Exp+Predicate =
{constant1 & constant2 ∈ ExpPredicate(W) | Predicate(constant1,
constant2) ∈ (W )} for expressing world descriptions over binary pred-
icates. The experienced constructive examples are expressed by humans’
described predicates within their constructed knowledge (i.e.,
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CK(Predicate)). Consequently, CK satisfies the humans’ world descrip-
tions based on their concept assertions and over their experienced con-
structive examples. For example, the constants bob and mary could be
the experienced constructive examples of the role fatherOf. Formally:
(bob, mary) ⊑ fatherOf. This constructive example could be subsumed
under a binary predicate within constructed knowledge. Equivalently,
we have the world description fatherOf(bob, mary).
Set 2. The set of humans’ experienced non-constructive examples of
their described binary predicates. It could be described by Exp−Predicate =
{constant1 & constant2 ∈ ExpPredicate(W) | ¬Predicate(constant1,
constant2) ∈ W}. The experienced non-constructive examples could
not be expressed by described predicates within constructed knowledge
(i.e., CK(¬Predicate)). Consequently, CK does not satisfy the world de-
scriptions based on role assertions and over experienced non-constructive
examples. For example, the constants bob and silvia could be the expe-
rienced non-constructive examples of the role fatherOf. Formally: (bob,
silvia) 6⊑ fatherOf. We have the world description ¬fatherOf(bob,
silvia), and in fact, CK does not satisfy the world description “Bob is
the father of Silvia”.
4.4. Summarisation
Let me go back to the example of Martin’s conception of ‘dogs’. In this
example, ExpDog is the set of Martin’s experienced examples of ‘Dog’
and it is equal to Exp+Dog ∪ Exp
−
Dog. Relying on ExpDog, we have:
(a) Exp+Dog = {i ∈ ExpDog(Martin’s description of dogs) | Dog(i) ∈
Martin’s description of dogs} ⊆ Martin’s constructed knowledge of
dogs. Consequently, Martin’s knowledge of dogs satisfies the concept
assertion Dog(i), where the individual i belongs to his constructive
examples of dogs within his own description of dogs.
(b) Exp−Dog = {j ∈ ExpDog(Martin’s description of dogs) | ¬Dog(j) ∈
Martin’s description of dogs} ⊆ Martin’s knowledge of NOT-dogs.
Consequently, Martin’s knowledge of dogs does not satisfy the con-
cept assertion Dog(j), where the individual j belongs to his non-
constructive examples of dogs within his own description of dogs.
According to the logical term [Reflection: C → P ] |= H, a reflection has
been described as a function that mirrors the humans’ conceptions [as the
outcomes of their constructed concepts] in predicates. These predicates
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could be used in expressing humans’ constructed concepts in terminologi-
cal systems. A sort of reflector functions from human beings’ constructed
concepts and conceptions into predications and described predicates could
formal-semantically satisfy the logical hypotheses. It shall be claimed
that the transmission of concepts from the detailed examination I to
the detailed examination II, is a kind of logical reflection that seman-
tically forms new hypotheses. The generated hypotheses could be used
to describe humans’ grasps of the world in terminological systems (and
terminological knowledge representation systems).
5. Conclusions
In this article, the phenomenon of ‘learning’ has been assumed to be
supported by an epistemology which argues that knowledge could be
constructed from an interaction between human beings’ experiences and
over their conceptions of what they have experienced (e.g., studied, seen,
heard, felt, touched). Accordingly, in this research, the term ‘concept
learning’ has been expressed as “the developmental process of concept
construction and specification of the constructed concepts”. Note that I
have not focused on an ontological analysis of concepts, but I have  by
considering the theoretical idea that concepts might be said to be a link-
age between the mental representations of linguistic expressions and the
other mental images that a human being has in her/his mind  focused
on conceptual and logical analysis of how terminological knowledge could
reasonably be assumed to be built based on an individual’s conceptions
of the world and over her/his constructed terminological basis. Conse-
quently, a logical background for theorising over the Human Concept
Learning Problem (HCLP) has been provided. It has been concluded
that the problem of human concept learning could be expressed in the
form of a function that expresses a human who constructs a concept
on a basis provided by her/his constructed knowledge. Also, her/his
knowledge is constructed based upon her/his terminological basis and
over her/his descriptions of the world. Accordingly, humans are con-
cerned with a set of experienced information in order to form new build-
ing blocks of their knowledge. Then, the union of the (i) Experienced
Constructive Examples of their Constructed Concepts and (ii) Experi-
enced Non-Constructive Examples of their Constructed Concepts have
been considered as the set of Experienced Concepts that support the
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developmental processes of knowledge construction. Assessed by logics,
a function (which I have called ‘reflector’) mirrors the humans’ concep-
tions in predicates. The predicates could be used in expressing humans’
constructed concepts within terminological systems. A sort of reflec-
tor functions from humans’ “constructed concepts and conceptions” into
“predications and described predicates” could semantically satisfy the
collections of humans’ hypotheses. The succession “Concept → Concep-
tion → Predication → Predicate” represents a logical flow that attempts
to satisfy the collection of logical hypotheses. More specifically, the
transmission of concepts from the detailed examination I to the detailed
examination II, has expressed a kind of logical reflection that semanti-
cally forms new hypotheses in order to describe humans’ grasps of the
world in terminological systems. It could make sense in terminological
knowledge representation systems and terminological knowledge bases.
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